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The sharing of ballistics data across Europe and neighbouring territories 
 
Abstract 
The current study explored the use of ballistic examinations and cross-border information sharing 
across 14 European countries. The presented data were collected using a mixed methods technique 
consisting of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires that were completed by participants. 
The results painted a very heterogeneous picture of the use of automated ballistic systems across 
these countries, as well as how ballistic analyses are integrated in the fight against gun-enabled 
crime. Three super-ordinates themes emerged from the thematic analysis: use of automated 
ballistic systems; Ballistic evidence recovery and analysis; knowledge exchange and best 
practices. The ability to draw firm conclusions regarding the value of ballistics comparison 
systems, either on a national or cross-border basis, is hampered by inconsistencies regarding data 
recording practices and definitions. Therefore, key recommendations are suggested to establish 
better cross border cooperation between member states and develop a better understanding of data 
sharing procedures. 
 
Keywords: Firearm; Ballistic evidence sharing; European ballistic database; Open case file; 
Cross-border comparison 
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1. Introduction 
 
Previous research has illustrated the importance of sharing ballistic evidence across borders [1]. 
The use of automatic ballistic comparison systems is now commonplace within forensic labs, 
enabling quick comparison of recovered bullets and cartridge cases from crime scenes to a 
database. When analysing ballistics evidence, ballisticians must examine and compare the unique 
markings that are transferred onto the bullets and cartridge cases when fired from a firearm. This 
is known as ‘rifling’, in which unique lands and grooves are indented on the bullet as a result of 
traveling through the barrel of the gun. Additionally, markings and impressions can be made by 
the firing pin, breech face and ejector/extractor marks on the cartridge cases [2]. These markings 
provide essential evidence for linking bullet/cartridge cases to guns.  
Further, experts are able to link firearms to crimes by comparing these unique markings. 
Therefore, many forensic institutes maintain what are known as open case files (OCF), where 
exhibits (i.e. bullets and cartridge cases) from unsolved crimes are stored [3]. Confiscated guns 
can be test fired to compare the projectile with the OCF, as well as new evidence found on crime 
scenes, to find potential “links”. The exhibits of an OCF are organised according to “class 
characteristics”: for bullets, these characteristics include the calibre, number, and direction of 
land impressions together with their width and pitch; for cartridge cases, characteristics include 
the calibre, shape of firing pin impression, breech face impression, and the position and shape of 
ejector and extractor marks (pp238) [1]. However, figures reported on ballistic analyses and the 
prevalence of their use to combat GEC are missing.  
The manual search using microscopes can be used in conjunction with automated systems 
to compare markings. As such, the use of automated ballistic comparison technology enables 
ballisticians to compare bullets/cartridge cases at a much faster rate and to combat gun crimes by 
linking firearms to crimes [4], known as hits. Ballistic automated comparison systems enable the 
conversion of spent cartridges and bullets in a two- or three-dimensional image that will be used 
to compare to other pieces of evidence recorded on the system. As such, correlation scores will be 
typically calculated for the firing pin impression, breech face, and ejector mark and ranked 
according to the most likely match on the system for cartridge cases to the least likely match. The 
most likely matches will be compared by ballistic examiners and confirmed in order to establish 
the presence of a hit [5]. Correlations are calculated using computer algorithms, in which images 
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of ballistic material are compared the content of OCF to run a correlation process, leading to a “hit 
list” ranking potential matches to the item being considered. Therefore, the number of hits that 
were identified by each country concern cases in which a spent cartridge or a bullet retrieved in a 
criminal investigation were matched with an item stored in the OCF within the country. There are 
two types of hits: “warm” hits that are investigative or intelligence-led, whereby investigators 
indicate a probable connection; and “cold” hits, in which a link or identification is made when no 
previous intelligence existed [1]. De Ceuster et al. [1] noted that OCFs are of great value when 
finding “cold” hits. The process of double casting (making microscopic quality replicas from 
ballistic evidence), has also been used as an alternative to sending original evidence for the purpose 
of international comparison or linking previous crimes, as well as in situations whereby the 
ballistic systems used were not interoperable between the interested parties [11]. 
 However, De Ceuster et al. [1] highlighted numerous limitations of ballistics comparison 
systems, such as: the limited capabilities of the correlation algorithms; the size of the database 
reducing the ‘hit’ rate as it increases, the creation of ‘noise’ by non-relevant evidence in large 
databases; the correlations influenced by factors such as the material in which the bullet or 
cartridge case was made or the presence of lacquer on the casing. Due to numerous limitations 
found with regard to the correlation efficiency, De Ceuster et al. [1] concluded that the use of 
cross-border sharing systems had little value at that time.  
 Despite the limitations raised by De Ceuster et al. [1], numerous advantages have also been 
shown, such as economic benefits and time efficiency with the possibility of a faster process of 
ballistics identification, and the reduction of backlogs and delays of these analyses, which in turn 
prevent further gun-enabled crimes [6,4,7]. Another argument favouring automated ballistic 
systems that is worth mentioning concerns the successful results that were obtained by the National 
Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) in the USA. In 1999, in an attempt to improve 
the efficiency of ballistics imaging in the USA, as well as sharing ballistic intelligence between 
the different States, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the 
Federal Bureau Agency (FBI) agreed on the implementation of a new system “NIBIN”, under the 
responsibility of the ATF.  According to King, Wells, Katz, Maguire and Frank [5], NIBIN was 
considered an effective system, totalling over 47,000 ‘hits’ by 2012. 
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 Automated ballistics systems are widely used across Europe. Several countries including 
the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Croatia and Kosovo have adopted the use of this 
technology, although the use of automatic ballistic comparison systems is not homogeneous, with 
different systems used in different countries such as PAPILLON Arsenal, Evofinder and the 
Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS). These systems provide the possibility to 
compare evidence at a national level but also offer the possibility of comparing evidence at an 
international level where weapons appear to travel across countries. However, compatibility issues 
arise between systems due to the use of different file formats, which in turn render data sharing 
problematic [1].  
The Interpol Ballistics Information Network (IBIN), founded in 2009, supports the cross-
border exchange of ballistic data within the EU and beyond, for countries which are equipped with 
IBIS technology. However, non-IBIN member countries can also benefit from IBIN’s international 
ballistics database through Interpol, using evidence recovered from test fires or double-casting 
resin replicas (making copies of bullets/cartridge cases) that can then be entered on IBIS and 
compared with other IBN member countries (cf. Interpol website). 
 The transit of firearms and their use in individual and mass shooting incidents has increased 
the prioritisation of firearms trafficking investigations across Europe. This issue is even more 
pressing given the recent increase in shooting incidents across Europe, which has led to Europol 
placing the trafficking of firearms on the watch list of the Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment [8]. Consequently, it was essential to obtain an up to date picture of ballistics 
technology and information sharing across Europe in order to determine whether the conclusions 
made by De Ceuster et al. [1] have been remedied by updates, or whether they are still applicable 
today.  
 
Therefore, given the absence of research providing evaluations on cross-border facilitation of 
sharing ballistics data, this mixed-methods study aimed to provide a holistic exploration 
concerning the perceptions of first hand users on how ballistic analysis can help to fight against 
gun enabled crime (GEC) across Europe and gather qualitative data which has been neglected thus 
                                                 
 All references to Kosovo are without prejudice to positions on status, and are in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 
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far. More specific objectives were to: (1) review the latest available figures for the number of 
ballistic evidence that were received in the labs, as well as submitted to the automated system 
within selected European countries; (2) identify the number of hits and to examine how ballistic 
data was shared across borders; (3) provide a detailed analysis of how ballistics intelligence is 
currently collated, used and shared between European Countries, Western Balkans and 
transnationally; (4) explore the perception of efficiency of ballistic comparison systems and 
whether ballistic intelligence provides evidence, that crime guns do travel across EU borders; and 
finally (5) identify areas of good practice for the ballistics procedure and to outline 
recommendations to improve such procedures. As such, a comprehensive study exploring the 
perceptions and understanding of core EU member states as well as select countries from Eastern 
Europe could be instrumental in strengthening protocols that are already implemented to share 
data throughout Europe. In addition, recommendations are needed in order to establish better cross 
border cooperation between member states and develop a better understanding of data sharing 
procedures, which should be implemented. 
 
2. Method 
The EU-funded project Examination of Firearms and Forensics in Europe and aCross Territories 
(EFFECT) [9] aimed to provide EU policy makers with a definitive body of knowledge concerning 
the nature, extent and impact of gun enabled crime (GEC), the effectiveness of interventions aimed 
at combating GEC and the cross-border sharing of ballistic intelligence. The overall project was 
divided into three strands: policy and legislation around firearms, policing gun crime, and ballistic 
analysis. This current study reports the findings from the latter strand, using mixed-methods 
consisting of the use of quantitative questionnaires (to fulfil objectives one and two), and semi-
structured interviews (to address objectives three to five).  
 
Research design 
The design of the questionnaire drew together previous studies and other relevant literature 
exploring the potentiality of a European shared database [1]. It also reflected the methodology 
used in King et al. [5] in which they investigated homicide cases that were resolved using the 
NIBIN system. The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) consisted of questions on the automated 
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systems in use (if any) or alternative methods (e.g., double casting), the quantity of bullets and 
cartridge cases acquired and correlated in the system nationally, and the number of hits derived 
from the correlations, as well as the existence and use of a Service Level Agreement.  
Information gathered from the semi-structured interviews will be focusing on the 
objectives set in the introduction on the topic of ballistic analysis to fight GEC. Interviews to 
ballistic experts aimed to collect more detailed data exploring the process of handling firearms, 
spent brass and fired bullets from crime scene, the challenges and the processes, the use of ballistics 
comparison system and automated system, international ballistics connection, recommendation on 
how gun crime could be prevented nationally and at international level. 
All interviews (conducted with individuals or groups) followed an interview guide designed 
specifically for different stakeholder organisations (i.e. policy makers, police, ballistic experts, 
statisticians, members of non-governmental organisations). This ensured that the data generated 
were comparable and reliable.  
 
Sample   
Individuals working for organisations involved in combatting GEC in Europe were invited to 
participate in the interviews and questionnaires. Recruitment was conducted via email and utilised 
a snowballing technique. Key stakeholders were identified and contacted directly, either using 
generic contact details that were publicly available on organisation websites, or directly contacting 
a named person provided through project partners and their connections. The nature of the research 
was explained in the initial contact and a request for participation was made.  
 Individuals conducting ballistic analyses were contacted in 14 countries; of these, 42 
participants were recruited from: the UK, France, Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo*, 
Sweden and Denmark. In the case of five countries, it was not possible to conduct individual 
interviews; instead, group interviews were preferred by the stakeholder organisation. In these 
instances, the role of each participant was clearly identified. All group interviews were conducted 
face-to-face, and individual interviews were conducted either in person or using Skype.  
All interviews were conducted by an experienced multi-national team of six researchers 
between July and November 2015. Where possible, the interviews were conducted in English and 
transcribed verbatim. However, interviews in Germany, Italy, and France were conducted in their 
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native language by our bi-lingual interviewers. These interviews were transcribed and translated 
into English by the respective interviewers. One interview was conducted using a translator who 
was appointed by the stakeholder’s organisation. In this instance, only the answers provided by 
the translator in English were transcribed. Of the nine questionnaires distributed to participants 
working in forensics, eight questionnaires were completed and returned to the researchers between 
August 2015 and April 2016. For Denmark, information from the questionnaire was discussed in 
their interview, and data has been extracted from this. 
 
Ethical approval 
Ethical approval was obtained prior to the start of data collection from the University Research 
Ethics Committee. At the start of each interview, written consent for each participant was obtained. 
Further, all participants were fully debriefed at the end of the interviews. Participants were 
informed of their right to withdraw their participation and were given up to seven days after the 
interviews to withdraw their data from analysis. Given the high sensitivity of the project, all 
personal information that explicitly identified individuals and organisations were removed from 
the transcripts and details of participants remained fully confidential. 
To avoid publication of sensitive data pertaining to ongoing operations by law enforcement 
agencies, participants were given increased ownership of their statements. As explained in the 
consent form, participants could express their wish to view the transcribed interviews before the 
analysis would commence. In order to maintain validity of research findings, statements could not 
be altered and would still be included in the analyses. However, participants were given the 
opportunity to identify any statements which they did not wish to be published. 
 
Data analysis 
The data collected from the questionnaires were collated and a descriptive analysis is 
presented in the tables in the results section. Furthermore, the rich, qualitative data collected 
from the semi-structured interviews were subjected to Thematic Analysis, in accordance with the 
guidelines by Braun and Clarke [10]. The transcripts were coded by the lead author and the 
second author then reviewed the codes and transcripts to establish that the codes were valid and 
that saturation had been reached. Excerpts were selected from the transcripts which provided the 
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clearest support for the themes identified and these are presented in the next section. In addition, 
these themes are consistent across the countries represented.  
 
3. Results 
 
The results outlined in this section are structured and discussed according to the three 
superordinate emergent themes: “use of automated ballistic systems”, “Ballistic evidence recovery 
and analysis”, and “knowledge exchange and best practices” that arose from the qualitative 
analysis. In addition, answers returned from the nine completed questionnaires were analysed in a 
descriptive manner and presented to support the qualitative analyses, as presented below.  
 
 3.1. Use of automated ballistic systems 
This theme discusses the use of automated ballistic systems across the participating European 
countries. The need for automated ballistics intelligence systems was broadly accepted by 
participants due to the number of pieces of evidence being received by forensic science 
laboratories, particularly when police requires the acquisition of all viable ballistics pieces. Such 
systems were also felt to make analysis easier and clearer, accelerates the process of identifying 
correlations, and provides a clear picture of gun usage across a whole country and are an important 
asset in the fight against GEC. Moreover, one participant emphasised their desire for all countries 
to be connected  
We think that it could be really, really good for the investigations of ballistic crimes to have 
automatic ballistic system linked around all Europe because it’s very easy for us to check 
any case with Portugal or with Denmark or the United Kingdom because we belong to the 
IBIN network but not so easy to do it against Germany, Austria, Belgium and some other 
countries that don’t belong to this network (1MESB)3. 
                                                 
3 In order to ensure participant anonymity, each participant was assigned a reference code and generated as follows: 
participant number within the country; gender (male or female); country (initial of country); and role (initial of role: 
e.g. B = ballistic; LE = law enforcement; P = Policy; NGO = non-governmental organization). For instance, 1FUKLE 
means participant 1, female in the United Kingdom, representing law enforcement. 
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It was acknowledged that automated systems can only perform part of the task, and once 
correlations are identified, ballistics experts are required to undertake manual comparisons to 
identify probable hits. Nevertheless, the systems were largely regarded as increasingly efficient 
with advances in technology, with some participants highlighting their desire to upgrade their 
current systems.  
However, for countries with low levels of gun crime, some participants did question the 
value of automated comparison systems. Participants also acknowledged there is still room for 
improvement: 
And the system nowadays, I think, they could probably improve, still improve, but they are 
quite efficient in a sense that finding their matches, if the signature is reproducible, it will 
come up high in the ranking list (4MBEB). 
As displayed in Table 1, three countries use Evofinder, six countries use a version of IBIS, and 
interestingly, two countries (Belgium and France) use more than one system. For Belgium, new 
items of evidence were being recorded in the latest system (Evofinder), and all the physical 
evidence from their OCF was scanned back on the new system (4MBEB). France had been 
carrying a double seizure of elements on both Cible and Evofinder whilst Evofinder becomes fully 
operational and networked. In addition, France will re-enter the physical elements stored in their 
OCF on their new system (1MFRB).  
 
Table 1. Use of automated ballistic systems across countries 
 
Country System used Date acquired 
Belgium IBIS Heritage 
Evofinder 
2002-2010 
Acquired in 2010, in use since 2014 
Denmark IBIS HD3D (bullet and 
cartridges) 
/ 
FYRM IBIS BrassTrax V2.4 2007 
France CIBLE 
Evofinder 
1994 – present 
March 2015 – present 
Germany Evofinder 2006 
Netherlands IBIS BrassTrax 2007 
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Portugal IBIS Heritage 2015 
Spain IBIS Heritage 
IBIS Trax (BrassTrax) 
IBIS Trax (BulletTrax) 
1999 
2006 
2009 
Sweden IBIS 3D HD 2013 (IBIS 2D since 2003) 
 Participants whose questionnaires were not available stated that they were using other 
systems. For instance, Russian Arsenal (Papillon) was used in Serbia and was also said to be used 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania (1MRSP). Kosovo* stated in their interview that IBIS Trax 
(BrasstTax and BullettTrax) was used, whilst the UK said the latest version of IBIS HD3D is used 
their country. The Carabinieri (Italian gendarmerie) in Italy were said to use IBIS but the version 
used varied across the country.  
 
3.2. Ballistic evidence recovery and analysis 
 
This theme refers to the ballistics process and analysis of recovered evidence. Five sub-themes 
were evident from the data: the process of ballistic analysis; open case file; test firing and the use 
of double casting; correlations and hits, and laboratory standards and timeliness.  
 
3.2.1. The process of ballistic analysis 
Participants widely reported that every effort is made to recover all ballistic evidence from crime 
scenes, including bullets, cartridge cases and firearms. There was also a general agreement 
amongst participants that cartridge cases make for better evidence, as bullets are often too damaged 
or unusable for analysis.     
Although some participants discussed following a protocol for analysing markings, it was 
apparent across the data that how this protocol is followed varies between countries. As such, when 
analysing different marks on cartridge cases to compare other exhibits and testing a potential 
match, inconsistences between processes are apparent in terms of the markings that are analysed. 
Participants from the Netherlands and Germany stated they do not examine other marks aside from 
the breech face and firing, as this is time consuming and ineffective; in their opinion, such items 
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are not the best evidence, and are not considered in the correlation (2MFDB). Conversely, practices 
in France, Portugal and Belgium examine all markings independently (fire pin, breech face, 
ejector), as well as other factors that would affect the analysis such as a change in light. Participants 
from Denmark pointed out that ‘wear and tear’ on bullets and cartridge cases can also occur, which 
can also impact on the analysis and comparison process (1MDKB). 
 Table 2 displays the number of cartridges and bullets that were submitted to a lab or 
acquired into a ballistics comparison technology system over the last 12 months. It must be noted 
that out of the nine countries, three gave approximate numbers and one did not possess this 
information. Moreover, Belgium reported their numbers in terms of items or group of items rather 
than per item of ballistic material, whilst Spain had differentiated numbers in terms of test-fire 
bullets/cartridges and unknown bullets/cartridges, and Germany reported that their numbers 
referred to evidence ammunitions. Additionally, FYRM reported that they did not have the 
equipment for inputting bullets and no database to assess the exact number of cartridges or bullets 
they had on their system at the time of the interview. This highlights the lack of standardised 
procedure for recording this type of information, thus rendering international comparisons 
difficult.   
 
Table 2: Number of ballistic items that were submitted/acquired over a 12-month period 
(data received between August 2015 and March 2016) 
 
Country No. of 
submitted 
bullets  
No. of bullets 
acquired in 
ballistic 
system (%) 
No. of 
submitted 
cartridge 
cases 
No. of 
cartridge 
cases 
acquired in 
ballistic 
system (%) 
Backlog 
(case) 
Belgium 110  82 (75%) 143  86 (60%) 17 
Denmark 380 380 (100%) 994 994 (100%) 0 
FYRM ~100 NA ~2600* ~340*(/) Unknown 
France / 1985 (/) / 3869 (/) 420** 
Germany 550  1890* (/) 540 3030* (/) ~11000 
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Netherlands ~1200 0 (0%) ~2000 ~400 (5%) <5 
Portugal 293 667* (/) 72 3114* (/) 0 
Spain 1263 615 (49%) 3230 1465 (45%) ~300 
Sweden 707 ~800 (100%) 1097 ~1600* 
(100%+) 
~20 
* In the case of Germany, Portugal, Sweden and the FYRM, acquisitions are greater than submissions. They may be 
reporting the total held on the OCF (Germany reported they retain an OCF of about 3,000 pieces), as opposed to 
acquisitions during that year. Alternatively, submissions may have been counted per case, or else may have been 
submitted from a previous period and only acquired within this period due to a backlog. ** to the 30th of June 2015 
  
As shown in table 2, only a proportion of the ballistic items received at the laboratory were 
acquired into the ballistic system, though Denmark and Sweden had submitted all items. Amongst 
cartridge case acquisitions, which are generally regarded as the most successful for generating hits, 
acquisition rates varied between 5% of submissions in Spain, to 100% in Denmark. The lower rate 
of submissions in some of the countries might be the result of variations in policy. In Sweden for 
example, the policy is to acquire all pieces onto the system other than approximately 5% of pieces 
that are not suitable for IBIS (e.g. partial bullets) (3MSWB). In other countries, there are 
limitations on how much material from each case should be acquired into ballistic systems. 
Another possible reason why all pieces may not have been acquired is due to backlogs; that 
is, the number of ballistics related cases more than 3 months old at the time of interview awaiting 
processing. However, backlogs were not reported as a major issue for most participants. Some 
participants stated the size of backlogs can fluctuate depending on the time of year. Participants 
from Spain and the FYRM did report having a backlog, both having stated that this is due to the 
number of cases and the circumstances surrounding them. At the time of the interview, the backlog 
across countries reportedly ranged from no cases up to approximately 11000 cases, although 
seasonal variations were identified. Portugal and Denmark both reported not having any backlog.  
Additionally, another cause of delays echoed amongst the participants was other forensic 
processes (for example, DNA testing), as ballistics teams are the last in the process to receive the 
evidence. However, according to a few participants, it is rare to find DNA on bullets and cartridge 
cases (2MFDB). 
 
3.2.2. Open Case File 
16 
 
The perception of best practice with regard to populating the OCF and automated ballistic systems 
was found to vary greatly between countries. Countries using an IBIS system agreed that all 
ballistic evidence should be inputted into the system. This included non-crime evidence, such as 
antique firearms. However, unless there is some indication that they have been involved in a crime, 
this type of evidence will not be looked at. Moreover, concerns were expressed by some of the 
participants about overloading systems with data, and the subsequent increase of ‘noise’ in the 
system, which may reduce efficiency and compromise the identification of probable hits. Thus, 
some participants considered that maintaining a smaller database increases the likelihood of 
obtaining a true match.  
 It was also apparent that there were differences in terms of how far back ballisticians look 
at ballistic items, depending on the type of crime committed, and any statutory limitations on 
prosecutions.  
“But those manual searches on a typical shooting would be local, so it would only be the 
Forces which are looked by that lab and it would go back two years. However, if it was a 
homicide and therefore it’s that much higher profile and more emphasis on getting any 
potential links, if there are, we would do a 5 year manual search and that would be done 
at all of the laboratories” (3MUKB).  
With regard to the evidence which is submitted into the OCF, it was deemed good practice to select 
the best elements that present different brands, though according to 4MBEB, it is a rare occurrence 
to gather all evidence into an OCF. Data suggests that typically, 2-3 cartridge cases are selected 
and put into the system from each case. Fragmented bullets should not go in the OCF, but they can 
still be matched to other bullets (4MBEB). In France, open cases are only kept for ten years, as the 
cases have expired judicially. When the expiration time has reached, open cases are destroyed 
(1MFRB). 
 Other participants simply reported that OCFs were not being efficiently and effectively 
used by investigators and prosecutors, due to a lack of awareness or lack of resources or time to 
send in evidence. As such, not all the pieces of ballistic evidence is being sent in, thus rendering 
the OCF incomplete, and therefore they cannot find the hits (1MLNB). Consequently, the majority 
of participants suggested there is a need to raise awareness of the importance of bringing together 
all ballistic material for analysis to increase the efficiency of the OCF, given efficiency relies on 
knowledge and consistency. 
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In addition, the issue of poor continuation in terms of training (e.g., relocation of staff 
trained in firearms matter or discontinuation of jobs, lack of hand-over of the expertise) was raised 
by some participants which has repercussions in terms of submission of ballistic material for 
analyses. Furthermore, in terms of lack of resources and heightened workload for the investigators 
occur when a ballistic hit is found with a cold case which means that extra work will occur. A 
participant has observed resistance or lack of interest from investigators to look at a cold case, 
when their own case is solved and judged: 
It sounds terrible but you think he or she, as investigators, they are investigating a murder. 
Actually being told that that weapon was used 18 months ago in another part of the country 
it’s like, doesn’t affect the murder they are investigating. It’s just more paper work and 
more work for them. (3MUKB) 
Two participants raised an issue of independent experts (1MFRB, 4MBEB). The use of 
independent experts can hinder the process of ballistics analysis, as they do not have access to the 
national database impair evidence gathering at a national level and prevent full comparisons 
between the recovered evidence and the OCF. For instance, 1MFRB provided an example in which 
a serial killer was able to commit more crimes with the same gun because the ballistic evidences 
were never passed onto the national police to be linked together. As a result of this investigation, 
ballistic criteria that ensure that experts are accredited, had to be implemented within the Justice 
system, to avoid such problems re-occurring. This account also highlighted how the lack of 
integration of independent experts with central system had led to the loss of highly valuable 
intelligence. 
In addition, a crucial element that was highlighted was that an incomplete OCF will 
automatically have a negative impact on the probabilities of finding a match and therefore lowering 
the possibilities of having an efficient system: 
I am sure that we don’t have all the evidence of all the shootings incidents that took place 
in Belgium, in here, which of course makes the open case files, less efficient on the long 
run; if you don't have too much evidence from the scene of the crime to compare with these 
firearms, of course it makes your database not so, extremely efficient (4MBEB). 
 
3.2.3. Test firing and the use of double casting 
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It was deemed good practice to test fire all firearms retrieved from crime scenes and compare the 
spent bullets and cartridge cases against the OCF and automated databases.  
A minority of participants regularly mentioned using double casting methods in the 
interview, with the only down side noted by participants being that the process of double casting 
was time consuming (1MESB). It was reported that double casts tend to be produced if the 
evidence needs to physically moved (4MBEB) and upon requests from IBIN members (2FMKB) 
to carry out comparisons.  
  
Table 3: The use of double casting 
 
Country Does the country 
use double 
casting? 
No. of double 
casts produced 
No. of double 
casts submitted 
to other country 
Percentage 
double-casts 
submitted to 
another country 
Belgium Yes Approx. 50 Approx. 20 40% 
Denmark Yes Approx. 30 30 100% 
FYRM No / / / 
France Yes None None / 
Germany Yes Approx. 10 5 50% 
Netherlands Yes Approx. 10-20 Approx. 25-40 100%+ 
Portugal Yes 5 15 100%+ 
Spain Yes 44 16 36% 
Sweden Yes 2-3 2-3 100% 
 
Although double casting [11] was used by all countries except one (see Table 3), a much smaller 
number of casts was produced (varying between none to approximately 50) when compared to the 
number of exhibits received. Although in France, facilities existed to produce double casts, none 
were manufactured during the period 2015-2016, as double casting is only undertaken when 
collaborating with IBIN (1MFRB). Of those who did produce double casts, four submitted 100% 
or more double casts to another country, and between 36% and 50% of double casts were submitted 
by the other countries. This suggests that for many countries, double casts are not produced 
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speculatively, but with a view to submit evidence into, or to compare the evidence to, another 
country’s database. The majority of countries that used double casting techniques also reported 
using automated comparison, but seemingly there were differentiations in the usage of double 
casts. For some, double casts were used for international comparison within Europe whilst others 
regarded the original evidence as easier to compare, or even to protect the evidence: 
Sometimes, we use double casting of course, for our own work. If we have lead bullets that 
could be worn out because we take out the lead bullets from the files and put them into 
microscope we will wear them down so that the traces will disappear.  Lead is soft and in 
that case, you can do double cast so you don't destroy the evidence. (3MSEB) 
 
3.2.4 Correlations and Hits  
 
The anomalies in data presented in table 4 suggested that countries used different measures for 
recording hits. For example, the number of correlated cartridge cases ranged from 43 in Portugal 
to a maximum of 175,800 in Spain. However, Spain reported that they not only included physical 
evidence in this number, but also online evidence. When asked for further information, they cited 
the number of acquired pieces, suggesting different understandings about the nature of a 
correlation. Additionally, the number of correlated bullets ranged from 0 to a maximum of 
36,900 (see below for clarification). 
 
Table 4: Correlation, hits and use of IBIN 
 
Country No. 
cartridge 
cases 
correlated 
No. bullets 
correlated 
No. of hits in 
the last 12 
months 
% of 
correlations 
resulting in 
a hit  
 
Use of IBIN 
to seek 
international 
ballistic 
connection? 
Belgium 86 82 3** 1.7 No 
Denmark 994 380  7**  0.5 Yes 
FYRM 340 0 3 0.88 Yes 
France Not counted Not counted 14  / No 
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Germany 3030 1890 28 0.57 No 
Netherlands 400 0 46  11.5 Yes 
Portugal 43 4 47  100 Yes 
Spain Max. 
175800 
Max. 36900 43  0.02* Yes 
Sweden ~800 ~ 1600 ~ 60 2.5 Yes 
*The correlation figures for Spain appear anomalous, and this may be a total figure rather than just correlations for the last 12 
months. **For Belgium and Denmark, participants specified in their questionnaires that the hits obtained were only cold hits.  
 
The percentage of correlations that resulted in hits ranged from 0.02% (although this was likely a 
result of the interpretation of ‘correlations’) to 100% in Portugal. Although it appeared that a hit 
rate from correlations of between 1% and 10% can be expected, there were clearly differences in 
the way hits were being recorded. Furthermore, there was no discernible pattern between the 
hit/correlation percentage and the ballistic system in operation in a country. For example, Belgium 
and Portugal used the same system, with very different reported hit rates. Interview information 
explained some of these anomalies. As demonstrated in Table 4, Belgium and Denmark identified 
that the hits that had been obtained were cold hits; i.e. hits that had not been intelligence-led. In 
Belgium, it was stated that one hit was obtained by using the double casting method, but it was 
intelligence-led. Therefore, there have been no cold hits using that method (4MBEB). In terms of 
hits, there was a variation in terms of how hits are defined through the participating countries:  
We did have some cross-border hits but, as I said, they were all from investigative leads. 
Which is not plain for me to be called hits. Called hits is like: oh, oh, I found a match, it's 
in the Netherlands, great, and we didn't know about it. But if they say, oh, we have this 
firearm being seized, it was probably used in this crime from the Netherlands, can you 
check that? and that is what we had at some point, we had a match, maybe two, cross 
border. So it was actually more of a confirmation, than an essentially a called hit. 
(4MBEB).  
 
…we do it upon request and you go specifically for the country that you have intelligence 
on (1MDKB on comparing with IBIN). 
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The number of bullets and cartridge cases submitted into the labs in the last 12 months differed 
across countries, ranging from approximately 100 to 1200 bullets, and approximately 143 to 2730 
cartridge cases. These items were recovered from crime scenes, test fires or unknown origins. 
Moreover, a range of crimes (e.g., gang-related armed robberies, illegal possession of a weapon, 
firearm possession and homicide) lead to hits not only within the participating countries but also 
cross-countries and appear to vary across time: 
So we have three years ago, we have 200 hits, because case goes to is a gang, they work 
and armed robbery of banks. It's a big gang, I think around 20, almost 30 people. They 
work in groups, they go to the bank one day and the other group go to the other bank so 
and other guys go do the work. (1MPTB) 
Eight of the countries that participated in the project were members of IBIN.  During the last 12 
months, only two of the international comparisons through IBIN were successful, with hits found 
between Portugal and Spain as well as between Denmark and Sweden; three hits were reported by 
respondents from Denmark with Sweden within the previous year. From the interviews, it appeared 
that the UK and the Netherlands also got a hit but not through IBIN. The FYRM had used IBIN to 
find a correlation but the results were negative. Belgium, France and Germany all received requests 
from IBIN but with no correlation found. Despite less than half of our participants having raised 
doubts as to whether hits could be found outside of neighbouring countries, the examples of hits 
that were provided were found geographically close.  As such, an example of an international hit 
via IBIN was given by Danish participants: 
I have an example of when a correlation was identified by using IBIN; it was actually a 
robbery in Sweden but since Sweden, Denmark and Norway are part of the IBIN, so it was 
an IBIN search, it’s a firearm that was used for a robbery in the northern part of the 
Sweden and was found in Denmark; and we test fired it and it was a cold hit and we 
identified it in IBIS. (1MDKB). 
In addition, when discussing the possibility that ballistic analyses could provide evidence that 
firearms travel across countries to be used in other countries, a participant from Belgium explained 
the outcomes of discussion that arose at an international experts’ workshop about gun crime:  
So everybody, alright everybody, many people explained about the situation in their 
country, what do you see, what kind of firearm do you see, and it was already clear that 
you see different guns in different countries or different areas of the country, so there must 
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be roads, that those guns come in but there they are disposed or being sold on the black 
market and they might be used but you see them only occasionally, coming towards other 
countries. (4MBEB). 
Although, one of the limitations highlighted by a participant is the difficulty to link a ballistic hit 
with perpetrators of gun crime: 
Yes maybe one day we will be able to do a hit between France and Spain, maybe, but it is 
still ballistic hits, it is not identifications of people (1MFRB) 
In terms of participants’ perception of the usefulness of automated ballistic systems, all raised the 
potential of this capability and its support for decision making but the adoption of the same system 
by all participants would not meet each country’s current requirements. Another concern regarding 
the use of cross-national comparison technology was a perception that this would breach data 
protection legislation and a way of improving combatting GEC internationally would be: 
And I think if we have a more universal / similar legislative standard and to have a better 
network of personal contacts, that would be really helpful. (1MFDLE). 
 
3.2.5. Laboratory standards and timeliness 
The importance of ballistic lab accreditation was evident, in which all ballistic processes have to 
be undertaken under service standards. Moreover, the importance of accredited staff was voiced, 
whereby trained lab technicians must meet the conditions within experience, training (which can 
be internal to the Institution) and diploma. As such, efforts are being made towards accrediting the 
laboratories. For instance, five countries (France, Kosovo, Portugal, Italy and the FYRM) reported 
working towards the ISO 17025 accreditation, which is seen by most ballistic experts as the best 
current standards. 
 As outlined in Table 5, participants reported on whether their lab implements a service 
level agreement (SLA). This SLA details the time in which labs will report results from a ballistics 
comparison to an investigator or intelligence officer. 
 
Table 5: Service Level Agreement and timeliness 
 
Country Presence of 
SLA 
Standard case Urgent case Possibility of 
fast response 
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Belgium No 60 days max 30 days max Yes 
Denmark No 5 days 90 minutes Yes 
FYRM No  30 days 1 day Yes 
France Yes 20 days max police custody 
timeslot 
Yes 
Germany No  Varies 8 hours Yes 
Netherlands Yes 30 days max 6 days max N/A 
Portugal No / / Yes 
Spain No Varies (over 
12months) 
Varies (max 60 
days) 
Yes 
Sweden No 120 days 5 days N/A 
 
Out of the nine countries, seven said that they did not have any SLA in place, whilst two said they 
had: France and the Netherlands. In France, it was reported that it usually takes around 20 days 
maximum for non multi-disciplinary files, but that ballistic analysts can always respond within the 
police custody timeslot and when an investigation needs urgent answers (1MFRB). In the 
Netherlands, it was discussed that ‘standard’ comparison cases have a turnaround time of 30 days, 
whilst tailor made cases (ballistic, technical, reconstruction questions) have a turnaround time of 
60 days. In addition, a ‘rush’ of ‘urgent’ cases can be processed within 6 days. The ballistic analysts 
argued that they deliver their reports in 95% of cases within the agreed time (2MNLB).  
For the seven countries that do not have an official SLA, they all aim to work within a specified 
timeframe. For ‘standard cases’, the turnaround time reportedly ranges anywhere from 5 days to 
12 months. For ‘urgent cases’, these are prioritised and can range between 90 minutes to 60 days. 
Turnaround times are dependent on numerous factors including crime type (i.e. the more severe 
the crime, the quicker the turnaround) and level of danger the firearm presents, whether there is a 
victim, the location of the suspect, and the location of the ballistic lab and the technology at their 
disposal.  
In practice, most participants reported that there is always an arrangement that can be made 
where flexibility can be afforded, and at least provide some oral feedback to help investigators in 
need of an urgent response. Given labs were able to prioritise cases, it was widely agreed that there 
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was no need for ‘walk-in Wednesdays’4, as urgent cases could be processed immediately and 
quickly. 
 
3.3. Knowledge exchange and best practices  
Many of the participants were part of the European Network of Forensic Science Institute (ENFSI) 
Working Group, and five participants described how the regular meetings provide opportunities 
of knowledge exchange between members and the sharing of best practice. Such meetings, events 
and workshops were deemed useful for the continuation of training, providing insights into other 
procedures or activities implemented by different laboratories across the various countries and 
exploring what works for each individual country. For instance, a participant from Spain discussed 
a previous collaboration with colleagues in the San Francisco Police State provided training on 
sub-class characteristics (1MESB). Participants from Denmark also reflected this practice, by 
having collaborations with other police agencies for training purposes:  
Yes we went to NABIS seminar last week and we just heard an investigator talking about 
that, saying that in most of the cases they went directly for the person behind the firearm, 
instead of going for the firearm and the story of the firearm actually. So there’s a lot of 
information there that’s lost and that’s our opinion as well (1MDKB). 
Additionally, ENFSI consisted of seventeen Expert Working Groups at the time of data collection, 
and most of the ballistic experts were members of the Firearms/Gunshot residues (GSR) group, 
which is considered a very important international network with a yearly conference in which 
presentations and workshops are delivered to share knowledge based practice. Furthermore, on top 
of the existing network expert groups (e.g., ENFSI, Firearms/GSR), some of the participating 
countries work routinely in close relationship, such as Portugal and Spain or Denmark with 
Sweden and Norway, who share common borders. 
Since 2001 we have shared network with Norway and Sweden so everything that is brought 
into the Danish database is correlated against Norway and Sweden and vice versa 
(1MDKB). And we have also some very good partners in both the Nordic countries but 
also the rest of the EU, and Europe (1MDKB). 
                                                 
4 Walk-in Wednesdays: were developed by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), to provide immediate 
feedback to the investigators concerning their ballistic evidence, after entering these into IBIS and searching NIBIN 
database. 
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The overall perception is that it is important to be able to share information across countries with 
some countries recognising how IBIN has helped to fight against organised crime (2FMKB), but 
also improved the possibility of making international connections to combat transnational crime 
by comparing ballistic data (1MESB). On the other hand, for participants who do not use IBIN, 
some felt that IBIN is not necessarily the best solution for them to share cross-border information: 
But as a country we refuse [to become part of IBIN] because, what’s the point for us to 
know that a gun has been seized in Guatemala or somewhere else in the world. It will 
hardly ever have anything to do with Germany. At the same time, we do help whenever we 
get any queries through the normal Interpol way. (2MFDB) 
Together, participants identified NABIS in the UK as being best practice in the fight against GEC. 
According to participants from the UK, good practice was deemed as having a good picture of gun 
usage, ballistic links, and gun market across the nation. Further, participants looked to the use of 
“inferred weapons” (1MXKP) as being good practice. According to 3MUKB, an inferred weapon 
is when a weapon is used in a crime (and has not been used in a previous crime), which will be 
identified in terms of specific type and send in an intelligence report. This allows the police to 
know the exact numbers of weapons that are actually being used or have been discharged in the 
UK. 1MXKP advocated that Kosovo is also utilising a similar method: 
So the inferred weapons, and actually, we are looking for the inferred weapons because by 
looking for the weapon, you will come to the crime. And I think it speeds up significantly the 
issue (1MXKP). 
4. Discussion 
 
This paper is the first descriptive and qualitative account of ballistic analyses in Europe using a 
mixed method design. The interviews showed cultural variations in the handling of ballistic testing 
and comparison, and how this could impact on the efficiency of systems with the potential for 
losing important intelligence that would not be shared efficiently. Moreover, there is currently no 
single shared European database and, at present, the possibility of linking databases on an EU-
wide basis is restricted due to the use of reportedly incompatible systems. Whilst there are 
processes for cross-border checking through the Interpol IBIN system, double-casting and linking 
compatible systems in neighbouring countries, the capacity for cross-border networking is 
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currently limited. Communication on data sharing is also done on a case-by-case basis depending 
on the participants needs.  
 Taking into account the findings from both the qualitative and quantitative parts of this 
study, the ability to draw firm conclusions regarding the value of ballistics comparison systems, 
either on a national or cross-border basis is hampered by inconsistencies regarding data recording 
practices and definitions. As with other forms of forensic evidence, there is clearly a process of 
attrition, which starts with the collection of ballistic material from crime scenes and test fires, 
through to the submission of bullets and cartridge cases, the acquisition of pieces onto automated 
systems or through manual comparison, the number of correlations that are identified, and then 
those that result in a hit. Following this, further attrition will occur through the investigation and 
prosecution process. Due to anomalies and differences in recording and reporting of this process, 
it is difficult for this study to accurately state the average number of hits as a percentage of the 
number of ballistics items submitted and acquired. In order to assess the effectiveness of ballistic 
intelligence systems in identifying hits therefore, more consistent and robust systems are clearly 
required to evaluate this process, or a more in-depth study that follows individual cases in a 
consistent manner would need to be undertaken. 
The results showed that all countries included in this study are using an automated ballistic 
system, the choice of which varies across the European territory with two main systems: IBIS and 
Evofinder. As such, a previous study suggested that complete interoperability between the two 
systems could only be possible with the full cooperation of the manufacturers [12]. Though, as 
discussed by De Ceuster et al [1], this is unrealistic, given the financial gain at stakes, that 
manufacturers will share their intellectual property to create an interoperable system. Double 
casting, however, which is used in all the countries who responded to the questionnaire apart from 
one, can be seen as an alternative that enables every country to examine evidence across border 
when there is an intelligence lead. As such, this process has been used by seven out of nine 
countries to search for an international ballistic connection. 
Further, as expected [1], spatial proximity of the hits was observed in the interviews (e.g., 
Denmark and Sweden or Portugal and Spain). The obtained hits were mainly based on previous 
intelligence about a case which then confirmed the correlation. However, most participants agreed 
over the fact that cold hits would be more useful for investigative purposes but issues of 
implementing routine search for cold hits were raised. In parallel to the current study, colleagues 
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also looked at correlating 1000 cartridge cases from crime scenes from Serbia with the databases 
of Denmark, Italy, Kosovo*, Norway, Serbia, Sweden and the FYRM. A total of 53 probable 
ballistic connections were identified, mainly within Serbia, but also with countries outside Serbia 
including Kosovo* and Sweden (see EFFECT project report [13]). Although, the experiment was 
only done on a small scale, these findings demonstrated a clear potential in understanding the 
movement of criminal firearms. It would therefore be beneficial to develop a series of pilot studies 
identifying and assessing the number of firearms that are travelling across Europe (for example, 
from South-East Europe to Northern Europe) and their travel routes. 
In addition, issues were also found when looking at the figures provided in the 
questionnaire, as variations were found in terms of how ballistic hits are counted and how they are 
defined. As a result, it is paramount that best practice guidance is developed and should include 
defining ballistic hit recording protocols. To have a clear view of international ballistic 
connections, an agreed definition and method of counting should be approved between the 
European countries. There is a need to record figures related to ballistic intelligence in a 
standardised manner with a common language in order to assess accurately how firearms are 
trafficked. 
Conversely, taking into account that some of the participant’s countries do not have a 
complete national OCF for various reasons (independent experts not feeding in their ballistic items, 
conscious decision by an investigation team to not use the ballistic analyses, lack of awareness of 
the existence of the OCF), the number of national hits, which varied between three and sixty in the 
current study, would be affected. Therefore, ballistic intelligence training and best practice 
guidance should be developed for relevant staff in member states, including Investigators, 
Intelligence Staff, and Prosecutors. This should include the provision of knowledge and 
understanding regarding the value of carrying out checks against the OCF. 
The interviews showed mixed opinions as to whether a shared system is needed, with some 
participants expressing an interest in having everyone connected via a shared system. In addition, 
there is some acknowledgement that such capacity would be beneficial, and this is further explored 
below. However, participants also highlighted that major issues would arise by having such a 
system that would need to be resolved if they wanted to even consider being part of a shared 
European network.  
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Consequently, recommendations in terms of how our results should be contextualised 
within the different northern, southern and eastern European cultures need to take into account the 
cultural diversity reflected in our interviews (e.g., different judicial system, political and economic 
situation of the country). Therefore, should a shared European database be created, the following 
recommendations outlined henceforth should be considered.  
Firstly, there should be a single point of contact with whom all labs working in ballistic 
analysis can centralise results and material for the whole country. This contact would also be 
responsible for maintaining and monitoring the OCF. This would enable each country to have a 
global picture of the nature and the prevalence of gun problems (e.g., what type of guns are used 
in their country to commit crime and from where they originate) but also in terms of ballistic 
analysis and correlations with previous crimes. 
An action plan for 2015-2019 was set up in November 2014 at the Council of the European 
Union, which includes the creation of Firearms focal point (FFP) for every partner in South East 
Europe reporting through Europol. These focal points would lead data collection by using a 
standardised template fulfilling the intelligence requirements. The European agenda, in charge of 
combatting illicit trafficking, is set to improve, among other actions, the operational cooperation 
between EU member states and other countries. As such, the current findings reemphasised the 
need for inter-connected national focal point on firearms, creating a better intelligence picture of 
illicit trafficking in firearms by providing an expert analysis and strategic reporting [14]. The 
Commission has offered to facilitate the exchange of ballistics' information by using a ballistic 
network and other relevant systems already used by member states, as well as supporting a FFP 
within each Member State who would report back to Europol FFP on the analysis of ballistic and 
criminal intelligence of their own countries [14]. It appeared that none of the interviews mentioned 
FFPs and therefore, this re-emphasised the need to establish these FFP within each member state 
who should take a leading role in coordinating ballistic intelligence through an agreed protocol 
and memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and report to a dedicated European Firearms Fusion 
Centre within Europol. 
 Secondly, participants from Belgium and France raised the use of independent experts as 
problematic, given the lack of standardisation between their procedures. Therefore, independent 
experts should be accredited in order to ensure their competence of performing ballistic analysis 
is of a similar quality and standard as that of national labs. Furthermore, private experts should be 
29 
 
expected to feed material back to the central single point of contact (FFP) to ensure the OCF is 
kept up to date, and the results of their analyses should be recorded.   
 Thirdly, the training of the different actors involved in the fight against gun crime should 
be systematic and consistent with a top to bottom approach. As such, it would be very interesting 
to have a survey for the ENFSI members to assess which are the competencies and skills that are 
essential to work as an accredited expert (see the ISO 17025 norms) and whether there could be a 
possibility of monitoring how this is implemented across Europe. To ensure best practice, all labs 
across EU and South East Europe should strive for ISO 17025 accreditation. Consideration should 
also be given to the development of accreditation standards for firearms experts and the creation 
of a register of firearms experts working inside the EU. Such a register could be held by ENSFI. 
Fourth, a decision would need to be reached within each country as to who would be in 
charge of maintaining and implementing a ballistic database. With regard to resources within an 
inquisitorial system, a governmental agreement should be sought to allow ballistic analysis to be 
affordable for everyone, to ensure all investigating judges can use the database, or at the least 
afford to submit firearms, bullets and cartridge cases into the OCF. Another issue that was raised 
pertains to the workload for the investigators when a link is found with another case and the 
resistance or the lack of interest to look at a cold case, when their own case is solved and judged. 
Although it might not be possible to inject more resources to support the investigators in their 
workload, due to the current economic climate in the European context, it is vital to raise constant 
awareness of the benefits of populating the OCFs and of having a clear picture of gun usage in a 
country. With the increase in usage of machine gun (AK types of weapons) in terrorist attacks, 
such as those seen in Paris in 2015, ballistic analyses might reveal where these weapons might 
have previously been used. Therefore, the intelligence that could be gathered from ballistic 
connections will support in preventing these weapons to transit via the identified routes. Again, 
the proposed European Firearms Fusion Centre could act as the conduit for the facilitation of Pan-
European investigations and intelligence matters following a cross-border ballistic hit facilitated 
by the ballistics correlation server. 
Fifth, all participants agreed that the use of an automated ballistic comparison system 
speeds up the comparison process. However, the use of such systems is not homogenous among 
countries, in that different countries use different systems. Therefore, it is recommended that 
consideration should be given to implementing an EU-wide Ballistics Information Network. The 
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network should facilitate the proactive correlation of European ballistic material based on an 
agreed Pan-European protocol. Such a network should incorporate a common set of processes and 
products in line with those of the Firearms Focal Points. To inform such a development, a 
feasibility study should be carried out to determine the achievability of a pan-EU network. Such a 
study should assess the technical and process capabilities required to implement such a solution. 
The study should specifically seek to address participant's concerns regarding data noise, whilst 
providing a detailed understanding of the potential limitations and benefits of such a system. 
Moreover, according to De Ceuster et al [1], OCFs are integral when finding cold hits 
(whereby no previous intelligence existed). Therefore, another question that arose is: should 
automated ballistic systems be used to confirm a lead (i.e. warm hits), or should it be used for 
cold cases when there is no prior information leading to the hit? Currently, it appears that 
running automatic correlations against a shared network, such as IBIN, would not be feasible for 
the reasons cited in the introduction. As such, the feasibility study that is recommended in the 
previous point would address the concerns raised by participants. 
 An agreement needs also to be reached in terms of what should be included in the shared 
database, as caution has already been recommended in several past studies indicating that in 
terms of firearms for example, ideally, all should be included in the system [15]. However, issues 
were raised that shotguns tend to leave unclear/poor identification marks and that guns with 
interchangeable barrels are also problematic in terms of identifications [15]. In addition, a shared 
European system was considered inefficient in terms of staff use and technology for several 
reasons highlighted in De Ceuster et al [1]. Indeed, the potential for achieving reliable hits 
decreases the greater the size of the database which mitigates against a multi-country database. 
Ultimately, the data presented are supportive of the previous findings by De Ceuster et al [1,16], 
in that the additional workload in terms of running comparisons was also stressed by the 
participants. And finally, the low cost-benefit ratio that was found by De Ceuster et al [1] with a 
small hit rate should be considered against the high cost of equipment and personnel. 
Sixth, another concern that was expressed by a number of participants relates to legislation 
issues and data protection that can be involved in sharing the data through a network. This is an 
important issue as one of the key benefits of sharing ballistic intelligence is the anonymisation of 
the data and the fact that no personal information is exchanged. As such, a definitive statement on 
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the position of ballistics data in relation to European Data Protection regulations should be clearly 
articulated in order to facilitate the consistent sharing of information on a pan-European basis. 
Finally, participants who had identified best practice in their interviews mentioned the 
importance of integrating the information received from the analysis with the intelligence on the 
weapon that was used and where was that weapon acquired and how did it travel. This gathering 
of information could help in linking gun-enabled crimes as well as resolving crimes where a 
suspect has already been identified from a previous case. Interpol and Europol should work closely 
to provide support, good practice guidance and technical capability to all EU countries and 
neighbouring states in regard to ballistics intelligence and the sharing of ballistic material. This 
should be in line with the development of the European Firearms Fusion Centre and the creation 
of an EU-wide Ballistics Information Network. Such work should ensure the development of a 
complete and robust Pan-European intelligence picture in relation to the criminal use of firearms.  
 
 This study is not without limitations; the interviews were conducted between July and 
November 2015, preceding the very lethal terrorist attack that occurred in Paris in November 2015 
in which illegal guns were used. Therefore, participant views and opinions may have been altered. 
Another limitation of this study is that no questions were asked specifically about the number of 
international ballistic hits, and therefore, taking into account the concerns that were raised in De 
Ceuster et al. [1], a feasibility study should be carried out to determine the viability of a pan-
European network. Such a study should assess the technical and process capabilities required to 
implement such a solution. The possibility of international ballistic linkages could highlight trends 
in the distribution of firearms across countries and would provide a critically valuable resource for 
the intelligence and investigative capabilities within Europe. However, there is currently no single 
central location where ballistics data and associated intelligence/information is collected, 
evaluated, analysed and disseminated. 
Although at the time of the interviews not all countries possessed an SLA, all the 
participants reported working towards a deadline to provide full reports to investigation teams and 
mentioned prioritising cases according to their importance. Flexibility was reported by all 
participants to provide investigators with at least a verbal report of the results when they are 
urgently needed. Therefore, it can be argued that the creation of a standard, best practice time scale 
expectation for the acquisition, correlation, and reporting of ballistic crime related items should be 
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considered in order to increase the intelligence and investigative value of ballistic material. This 
should be based on crime type and public impact.  
The limitations of the current study include that answers given by the respondents were not 
always easily interpretable, as the questionnaire did not give opportunity to expand on their 
answers. In addition, not all countries of the EU were interviewed (due to limited timeframe of the 
project) or agreed to answer this questionnaire. Future research could look at including all 
European countries (and candidate countries) to present a more exhaustive representation of 
different cultural perspectives on this topic. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The practices around ballistic analyses and sharing information on ballistic connections is 
heterogeneous across the countries looked at in the current study. Knowledge exchange between 
countries demonstrates clear benefits both for exchanging best practice, and for improving 
understanding of trends and issues in firearms movements, allowing for more efficient targeting 
of resources. It does appear that a better collection, integration, evaluation, analysis and 
dissemination of ballistic material, in conjunction with intelligence and reporting information 
could improve the combat against the use of illicit firearms both within the EU and South East 
Europe. 
 The possibility of drawing firm conclusions on the value of ballistics comparison system 
at national or international level is hindered by inconsistency in the reported figures that may cause 
data to be misread and misreported. As such, this has the potential to affect information quality 
but also important intelligence from central systems. The figures reported in this paper show that 
ballistic information is being collected and analysed in different proportions according to the 
different countries under study. 
Variations in terms of systems, or version of systems, that are used by the different 
countries created a very fragmented picture of ballistic analysis with the added complication of a 
lack of interoperability of these systems to facilitate international comparisons. Despite the 
existence of processes to carry out cross-border comparison through double casting or Interpol 
IBIN system, the capacity for cross-border networking is limited. Some participants recognised 
that such capacity would be beneficial. 
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